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Abstract 
In recent years, interest in comtemporary conceptions and self-understandings of the social order 
has grown among historians, yet the field of an "intellectual history of society" is little expJored 
for modern Germany. This paper surveys the field and asks how Germans from the early 
modern era up to the present time of German reunification conceived of the social order they 
were building and living in, and it provides an overview of the developments of such major 
concepts as "estate" and "class," "community" and "society," "individual" and "mass," "state" 
and "nation." Three major points emerge as persistent and distinctive features of German social 
self-conception in the nineteenth cand twentieth centuries: the intellectual construction of 
dilemmas between social conformity and social fragmentation; the difficulties of conceiving of 
society as a plitical society; and the "futurization" of an idealized, utopian social roder of 
harmony that was hoped would one day replace the perceived social disintegration. 
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preeminence and steps back to be--as it had been in the early modern period 
and before--only one element in a multidimensional web of social order. Social 
and economic historians cannot any longer take the years between, roughly, 
1870 and 1914 as a yardstick for more than two centuries of constant change, 
just because an important generation of social scientists, economists and 
philosophers between Karl Marx and Max Weber happened to develop their 
concepts of inequality and modernity during that period of time: However 
serious they attempted at a general framework of theoretical concepts, their 
efforts still very much reflect their own contemporary experience, an experience 
different from our own or from, say. the 1820s. 
Before searching for broader and more appropriate concepts that may in the 
future be able to synthesize nineteenth and twentieth-century social history. it 
might thus be important to start an inquiry into contemporary experiences and 
understandings of "society". of social order and social inequality. as they 
developed since the era of the American and French Revolutions, and that is 
what this paper, taking the German case as an important example, will be 
concerned with. In which ways has German society from 1800 up to the 
present conceived of itself, what concepts of togetherness and difference did it 
develop from the Napoleonic reform era through reunification? And did it 
consider itself to be a "society" in the first place? Social history has too much, 
it seems to me, taken its own subject for granted; histories of German society 
are being written, and a German society certainly existed around 1900--but did 
it exist in 1780 or 1840; or in 1960, for that matter? How, then, did this feeling 
of social togetherness emerge and develop among Germans in the nineteenth 
century. and what were its main impulses of change in the twentieth? And if 
"class" and socioeconomic inequality constituted only a part of social . 
experience--around which competing concepts of social bonding and separation 
have Germans expressed their experiences of social communication and order? 
From Aristotle and the Greek polis onwards, for example, notions of social 
order have always been inextricably connected with ideas of political order and 
domination, thus rendering society a "political society": What kind of political 
society did Germans envision for themselves since the time when 
enlightenment and revolution fundamentally redefined the relationship of 




The closing of the twentieth century--be it still a few years ahead or already, 
with the revolutions of 1989/91 and the overthrow of the "old world order", a 
matter of the past--has in recent years caused historians to ask questions about 
the nature and underlying principles of this century: How are we to attain a 
genuinely historical understanding of an era that until very shortly either 
appeared as our own present or as an appendage of. the historical "modernity" 
which supposedly crystallized in the preceding, in the nineteenth century? Is 
. . 
there such a thing as the unity of the twentieth century, and what does it 
consist of, compared to the familiar historiographical notions of an "industrial 
revolution", of "modernization", or of the "formation of class societies", to 
name only a few of the organizing and uniting principles of the nineteenth 
century which usually guide historians--and the wider public--through the 
jungle of specialized research and writing?l The ongoing process of 
"historization" of the twentieth century thus bears immediately upon our 
conceptions of the nineteenth century--and even of the early modem era--which 
seemed so comfortably settled for the last three decades or so. 
For social history in particular, the dissol~on of class societies and the 
emergence of new structures of social order and inequality, processes which of 
course had long been apparent before 1989, increasingly undermine the tacit 
(and often outspoken) assumption that "class formation" can serve as an 
overarching paradigm for the analysis of nineteenth and twentieth-century 
western societies, of "modem" societies, as the conventional usage goes:2 
Indeed, it is now not only doubtful whether "class" constitutes a distinctive and 
universal mark of "modernityt'; it even seems as though "class" (--and one 
could easily make a similar argument for the concept and process of the 
"industrial revolution"--) was only the phenomenon of a relatively short 
transition p.eriod, of just a few decades in the late nineteenth and perhaps the 
early twentieth century. In this perspective, socioeconomic inequality loses its 
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knowledge opened for the analysis of "everyday thought" again, without, 
however, going back to the Marxian materialist frame of interpretation. Indeed, 
in conceiving of. society itself as a social and intellectual construction of social 
actors, Berger's and Luckmann's approach is sometimes coming close to the 
opposite danger of idealistic reduction. But it offers an excellent starting point 
for an intellectual history of society, a theoretical starting point of which 
historians have yet made too little use.3 
The very phrase "intellectual history of society" denotes a second and very 
important general aim of this endeavor. It may be regarded as a crucial 
weakness of current German historiography that it almost completely lacks-­
despite strong traditions dating back to the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century--an established field of research in intellectual history, or 
"Ideengeschichte", as it may be called according to German traditions, at a time 
when different strands of intellectual history play an important--and often 
innovative--role in American, French, or British history. While the origins of 
this development cannot be explored here in detail,4 an attempt shall be made 
at giving an example of what a new intellectual history in Germany might look 
like. It certainly cannot simply continue where Meinecke ended, but has to take 
into account the developments and achievements of social and cultural history 
during the past three decades, and from the point of view of social history, 
strong potential links to a history of ideas have already been provided by the 
"culturalist turn" which it experienced in Germany as anywhere else in recent 
years.S Yet while a socioeconomic notion of social history has fallen into wide 
disregard and research into "experience" and "subjectivity" thrives, German 
statements about cultural history and "Alltagsgeschichte" rarely reveal 
genuinely theoretical efforts and are strangely unaware of the fact that a 
modem conception of intellectual history might broaden and strengthen their 
own enterprise as well as social history in general. This new conception, 
however, would have to be different from what is sometimes suggested by 
social historians as a "social history of ideas", a concept that is in danger of 
falling back to a reductionist, "Ideologiekritik"-notion of "explaining" ideas 
with their social surroundings and materialist environs. The purpose of this 
paper is to delineate an."intellectual history of the social" rather than a social 
history of ideas. and a history of social self-understandings could thus be a 
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And finally: A critique of broad concepts of modernity, of class formation or 
industrial revolution also implies an insistence on the uniqueness of "national" 
societies, or at least, the uniqueness of experience. Even if the overall 
development of German, American and French society under the auspices of 
industrial capitalism, urbanization and reluctant democratization may have been 
very similar, perceptions of society could differ to a great extent and indeed 
did. What peculiarities, then, characterized German self-understandings of their 
society. and what were the reasons for those peculiar experiences? The last 
question, of course, raises the broader and complicated issue of factors 
contributing to and influencing social self-definitions, and while it may be too 
early to answer this question in a systematic manner before empirical research 
on the topic is being done, it is certainly clear that understandings of society 
only develop in close interaction with the "actual" formation of society. and it 
is the tensions and discrepancies between both that are of particular interest to 
the historian. 
Apart from the above mentioned concern with the understanding of modernity. 
there are several important motives and intentions that direct and influence an 
effort to investigate ideas of social self-description. and I will mention only 
four of them. Firstly, on a theoretical and methodological level, it may be 
called an exercise in the sociology of knowledge. It is important to remember 
that the Marxist idea of "Ideologiekritik" is probably the single most influential 
root of this discipline: Sociology of knowledge originated with the critique of 
"false consciousness" by means of a materialist analysis of society. This 
Marxian argument for the first time provided a systematic, explanatory link 
between social structure and social consciousness--if in the "negative" sense of 
"revealing" the alleged inappropriateness of social ideas particularly among the 
ruling classes. While Karl Mannheim in his conception of a sociology of 
knowledge tried to avoid the pitfalls and shortcomings of sociological 
materialism, he moved the field in a problematic direction by defining 
sociology of knowledge in the framework of a history of ideas (in the Idealist 
German tradition), and by at the same time conceiving of "ideas" as elaborate 
and sophisticated structures of thought explicitly developed by a few "great 
men", Only with Berger's and Luckmann's "Social Construction of Reality", 




As society is the genuine realm of sociology and as most of the concepts 
discussed above were developed and first employed by sociologists, an inquiry 
into social self-understandings is also, fourthly, an historical exploration of the 
social sciences and their formation of theoretical concepts; it is an attempt at 
historizing contemporary social theory from its very beginnings in the late 
eighteenth century up to the present and at situating it within its own historical 
and social context. The history of social theory is not so much an immanent 
process of "progress" achieved by an ever-harder thinking in the loneliness of 
one's study,10 but can to a large degree be considered a part of society itself 
and its history.ll Descriptions of society as developed in German social theory 
from Lorenz Stein and Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl to Tonnies, Simmel, and 
Weber. from the sociology of the Weimar Republic to current (West) German 
social theory can be used by the historian as a source for contemporary self- . 
understandings of society,12 and it is only very recently and hesitatingly being 
discovered as such.13 This approach at a historization of social thought is as 
important for a critical self-reflection of sociology as it is for an intellectual 
history of society, although the latter cannot rest upon an analysis of social 
theory alone. 
Interest in social self-understandings has in recent years grown among 
historians, together with an increased attention paid to the history of language 
and to the relationship between language, social consciousness, and class 
formation. As previous attempts to analyze societies in terms of 
macrosociological structure have lost some of their attraction and skepticism 
regarding the explanatory power of these seemingly "objective" approximations 
to past societies has mounted, historians realize the importance of self­
definitions and social experience for the shaping of social action, social 
relations, and social structure. In the broader reframing of methodology and 
historical theory underlying this shift as well as in empirical scholarship in the 
field, British and American historians have often led the way, starting with the 
enormously important impulses given by the "reinvention" of political language 
analysis in the works of Quentin Skinner and John Pocock.14 The point for an 
examination of class formation through language and discourse has been made 
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useful field to explore possible relations between social history and a "new" 
intellectual history in general. 
These relations also extend--and this is my third concern--to important 
methodological problems of social history and of historical writing on the 
whole. Because history, and social history in particular, constantly has to cope 
with the problem of choosing adequate concepts for the description of past 
realities that conform to the consciousness and experience of the 
contemporaries and at the same time relate to the conceptual and social horizon 
of its readers in the present, it has to be aware of the historical origins and 
usages of its categories--e.g., social categories such as "class," "Biirgertum," or 
even "society" itself. This concern, of course, has been at the very center of 
German "conceptual history," or "Begriffsgeschichte", for many years,6 but it 
needs to be carried further towards an historical investigation into the 
foundations of historiographical concepts in order to make social history more 
self-critical about the concepts and theories it employs. The notion of "class", 
as discussed earlier, is a case in point; a second one is the idea of a split and 
antagonism between "state" and "society" in modem Germany that has served 
as an influential paradigm of nineteenth-century German history. particularly 
since the 1960s.7 This concept is now so much taken for granted that it is often 
being reified as a structural feature of German society, instead of regarding it 
as a specific contemporary percEWtion in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries (--a perception. moreover, which not even all 
contemporaries shared--) that owed as much to certain intellectual traditions 
and political developments as to the actual formation of society and its alleged 
"separation" from the political sphere. By the same token, social historians 
often define the very term "society" in terms of an economically based order of 
social inequality, thus again generalizing a .specific and limited experience of a 
few decades in the nineteenth and early, twentieth century into a seemingly 
universal mark of modernity.s Yet contemporary conceptions of "society". 
particularly before the 1840s and after the 19308, were much more complex 
and encompassed many realms of social order and disorder that had little to do 
with economic inequality. For all the important social history that has been 
carried out in the past three decades, we still lack an intellectual and conceptual 
history of German society that builds upon and at the same time transcends this 
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the first half of the nineteenth century, and from then onwards, and gave way 
to the construction of another fundamental dilemma: The dilemma of either 
rigidly separating state and society, thus leaving the state without popular 
constituency, or of confiating state and society to the point of identity of both, 
thus depriving society of its liberty and heterogeneity. This pattern of social 
self-understanding took on very different forms, over time as well as in 
different social groups and sociopolitical contexts. Yet it may have influenced 
the development of a modem German society as much as patterns and changes 
in actual social structure and economic conditions, and although the German 
idea of society in many respects broke apart during the middle decades of the 
twentieth century, it still lingers on and gives a distinctive shape to problems of 
German society at the time of social reunification. 
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most forcefully in Gareth Stedman Jones's studies on Chartism and early 
English labor history and is now being carried further into studies of the British 
and American middle classes. IS For many reasons, some of which (such as the 
lack of intellectual history traditions) have been mentioned above, German 
historians have been much more reluctant to follow these ideas, especially in 
the field of nineteenth and twentieth century German history, whereas in 
medieval and early modem history important attempts have been made to 
understand contemporary categorizations of "society II , stimulated not so much 
by Anglo-American intellectual history, but by the French history of mentalites 
as developed in the "Annales" schooL 16 Without explicitly developing a 
research program in the history of social self-understandings, however, 
nineteenth and twentieth century social history during the past two decades has 
implicitly contributed many facets to a subjective history of society, and only 
this renders the following brief outline of development through two centuries 
possible. While it may, due to lack of empirical research, be too early to write 
a comprehensive "history of society from inside", the aim of this essay is, very 
modestly, to demonstrate the possibility--and the necessity--of research in this 
yet little-explored field, and to provide suggestions and first impulses for 
further research. 
Besides trying to live up to the theoretical program developed here, the paper 
will concentrate on a set of two interrelated arguments and theses concerning 
the historical development of social self-understandings in modem Germany. It 
seems as if German society during most of the time considered here was unable 
to conceive of itself as united and varied at the same time; Germans failed to 
conceptualize unity as multiplicity: They visualized unity as conformity, and 
they saw multiplicity as fragmentation.17 This problem again and again caused 
the intellectual construction of seemingly inextricable dilemmas, of alternatives 
apparently requiring a decision: between "state" and "society", between "mass 
society" and "atomization", between "society" and "community", and the 
conceptualization of society along those lines only led Germans ever deeper 
into both social conformity m.d social fragmentation. Germans, secondly, for 
most of their modem history lacked a convincing idea of society being a 
"political society". as it developed in other countries during the age of 
revolution.18 Seeds of a political society developed, but were submerged during 
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spheres of interaction: the relationship to the manorial lord, to neighbors, to 
family. As historical scholarship has long dismissed the notion of a medieval 
"state", it is equally problematic to speak of medieval "society" in the face of 
localized and particularistic structures, structures which moreover were not so 
much based upon units of "individual" persons, but on families and households. 
More abstract categorizations of social order derived from the idea of three 
functional "orders" or estates: the clergy, the nobility, and the peasantry, a 
concept that originated in French theological thought several centuries before 
the emergence of cities and became widespread in Western and Central 
-Europe.22 It was later adapted to provide a social place for the urban 
"Biirgertum",23 and from then onwards through the early nineteenth century, 
and in some respect through our own time, concepts of a tripartite order in 
different forms, inspired by the ChriS!ian holiness of the number three as well 
as by older Greek ideas, have dominated Western thought on societal 
structuration and have most often served as positive models, as models of a 
stabilized and balanced order, and were thus also linked to legitimations 
claims--as opposed to dualistic concepts that were also always present in 
Western social thought, but tended to stress conflict or, at least, subordination.24 
But in both types of social categorization, the perception of hierarchy was of 
central importance, the perception of high and low, the perception of estates 
and of their "appropriate", indubitable place within the larger social order. Men 
conceived of themselves as belonging to one of those estates, but this did not 
imply the modem- notion of belonging together with other (or even: all) 
members of the same estate, order, or social "station". On the contrary, it 
served primarily as a point of reference for relating oneself to persons of higher 
or lower standing, persons who one either was to meet with "deference" or 
from whom deference, a kind of natural, unquestioned subordination, could be 
expected.2S 
During the early modem era, however, particularly from the sixteenth century 
onwards, national or, rather, "proto-national" differences in the perception of 
social order began to develop, as nation-states consolidated and national 
"societies" gradually emerged in Europe and on Europe's Atlantic periphery. 
This process of social divergence was shaped by a wide array of determining 




People living together have always differentiated between "Us" and "Them", 
"High" and "Low", "Above" and "Below", "In" and "Out",19 and the most 
fundamental, primordial, anthropologically based concepts of differentiation 
have in many cultures tended to originate from family and clan institutions. 
The establishment of more complex and comprehensive social organizations 
then induced two important (and interrelated) innovations to these primary self­
definitions: Division of labor gave rise to a functional differentiation of 
"orders" (which could at the same time be conceived of as hierarchically 
graded), and the emergence of more complex schemes of political domination 
such as "kingdoms" generated concepts of "nobility", concepts of a group 
privileged most often by birth to rule over lesser people. All of these elements, 
including the still family-centered notion of clan allegiance, can be discerned in 
the ancient societies of classical Athens and Rome,20 but what set these 
societies apart were two eventually momentous "inventions" which broke up 
the traditional framework of social order and social self-understanding within 
the pre-modem world: First, the concept of "universal" (male) citizenship as 
present in the isonomia-concept of the Athenian polis as well as in the 
citizenship provisions of the Roman empire, and second, the social implications 
of, respectively, "republic" and "democracy", one of which, in the Athenian 
polis, was the notion of the mesoL the middling group of citizens, as being of 
vital importance for the stability and virtue of the community, a notion that-­
perhaps for the first time--explicitly denied the highest social ranks an 
"automatic" entitlement to the highest political standing and influence?l 
In medieval and early modem Europe, perceptions of social order were very 
much alike in all politico-social formations that would eventually develop into 
nation-states and "nation-societies" like France, Germany, or England. Hori.rons 
of communication were extremely limited, political authority and social 
relations often were inextricably linked in bundles of distinct and separated 
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its theoreticians--, between "Obrigkeit" und "Untertanen", between "Herrschaft" 
and "Landschaft", as Peter Blickle has described this opposition for the 
southwestern regions of Germany and parts of Switzerland where it was 
experienced--and resisted--stronger than elsewhere in Central Europe?7 Thirdly, 
the interpretive scheme deriving from the Aristotelian tradition was revived in 
the early modem period: a three-layered scheme of the "one", the "few", and 
the "many" that corresponded to the classi~al typology of constitutions, with 
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy as the basic forms of government 
distinguished by the number of people governing. This interpretation, however, 
was largely confined to political theory--at least through the mid-eighteenth 
century--and hence influenced "popular" definitions of the social order to a 
much lesser degree than the two other schemes. A common feature of all three 
interpretive frameworks was their bearing upon concepts of political authority 
and domination: Social order could hardly be conceived of as such, but was 
politically structured in a fundamental way: whether the three-order scheme 
referred to clergy or nobility as ruling orders, whether the subjects confronted 
"Obrigkeit", or whether the Aristotelian scheme thought of "social" groups as 
constituent bodies of types of government. Contrary to a common assumption 
among modem historians, however, this close intertwinement of what we today 
call "politics" and "society" was not a specific feature of "pre-modem" society 
that was bound to disappear with the "modem" "separation of state and 
society": With few important exceptions, nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
notions of the social order, as we shall see, retained this intimate link to 
concepts of politics. of sovereignty and authority. 
In many respects, indeed, the sweeping transformations of the "age of 
revolutions" brought this link only closer to the fore, for all the fundamental 
change in societal self-understandings that the closing decades of the eighteenth 
century gave rise to. In the French Revolution, the famous contention of the 
Abbe Sieyes that the Third Estate was "everything" implied more than the 
claim of a newly emerged social group to its adequate share in participation; it 
challenged the whole notion of a state's population being grouped in estates and 
created the idea of a homogeneous "people" that had been unthinkable before. 
The older claim to a share in representation was transformed into a demand for 
a single representation of the people, an idea that possessed an inherent 
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form of state formation and of the political consolidation of tenitories~ the 
political and social role of elites, especially of the nobility, in this process of 
extension of centralized political power; the degree and forms of (internal and 
external) commercialization in the early modem er~ and the development of 
the religious situation after the reformation and counterreformation had 
fragmented and "confessionalized" the once homogeneous Christian world. The 
religious factor proved especially important, because religious factions almost 
everywhere in Europe precipitated the emergence of political factions and 
parties und thus introduced a whole new principle of diversity and difference to 
European societies, a principle of difference which was not based on birth or 
other "ascriptive" sources, but was increasingly determined by individual 
preferences. Confessionalization, however, could have integrative as well as 
pluralizing effects, and whereas the latter prevailed in England, the former 
predominated, as the historian Heinz Schilling has argued, in Germany. 26 In 
collaboration with the forces of central European absolutism, the principle of 
"cuius regio, eius religion provided for segmentation rather than pluralism, for 
conformity within each tenitorial unit; and for similar reasons, the opposition 
between "Court" and "Country", which was crucial to the institutionalization of 
heterogeneity in other countries, never fully crystallized in the German states, 
and the German nobility refrained from building factions and parties, both 
within itself and against the princes, thus facilitating the practice of tolerance, 
but also of societal conformity towards the state. 
Somewhat generalizing a variety of experiences and patterns, three models of 
interpreting the social order can be distinguished in early modem Germany: 
Firstly, the three order-scheme as discussed earlier remained important and was 
constantly adapted to fit changing social and political circumstances, but it was 
never fundamentally challenged until the late eighteenth century. Secondly, a 
dualistic scheme gained prominence during the same time: Against the 
background of political centralization and state formation, of the "appropriation 
of political rights", to speak with Max Weber, and of the accompanying 
restraint of participatory rights among the peasant population, most common 
people increasingly perceived social reality in the early modem era as being 
structured by a sharp dichotomy between authority and subjects--the very 
notion of the subject, the "Untertan", was a creation of the absolutist state and 
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group with a feeling of togethemess, based on statehood and citizenship, among 
each other.32 
While the remarkable effort of reform politicians and ideologues to implement 
a particularistic, state-centered concept of "national" consciousness was only 
partially successful--paradoxically, more so in the Southem states, where the 
more rigid centralizing efforts of state bureaucracies were later complemented 
by constitutions, and less in Prussia, where regionalist tensions mounted during 
the Vorm4rz era and left the idea of a Prussian nation a buraucratic concept 
deserted by its social constituency-a, new notions of a political society were 
being developed around the phrase of "borgerliche Gesellschaft" (civil society), 
and the two competing concepts of civil society astute reflected the successes 
and failures of reform policies as well as longer-lasting regional traditions in 
the perception of social and political order. Hegel's definition of a civil society 
as the "system of wants" strongly emphasized what he and many 
contemporaries perceived as an increasing separation of spheres between "state" 
and "society", a kind of practical division of labor in which civil society, 
partially in the tradition of Ferguson and the Scottsh enlightenment, emerged as 
a state-free sphere of social differentiation and economic appropriation.33 
While this concept, particularly after the Revolution of 1848/49, prevailed and, 
for example, influentially shaped the social and political views of liberalism in 
the unification era, 34 most people in the South em and Westem parts of 
Germany through the 1840s continued to conceive of "state" and "society", of 
political administration, economic pursuits and social differentiation as an 
indivisible unity, a concept that was most forcefully theoretized by the Baden 
politician and writer Carl von Rotteck when he maintained that there was "no 
difference" between civil society and state, because "biirgerlich" for him, very 
much in the Aristotelian tradition, referred to the common political concems of 
citizens.3s Whereas the Prussian concept separated political and socio-economic 
spheres so thoroughly as to leave society devoid of claims for political 
sovereignty, the Southwest German ideal in tum tended towards a strong 
conformity of politics and society that could inhibit a free bargaining of 
interests, and the eventual triumph of the "Hegelian" tradition notwithstanding, 
both attempts to defme a relationship between the political and the social 
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dynamic towards the assertion of popular sovereignty and thus towards the 
republic. A very similar process had provided the intellectual and social 
rationale for the invention of American republicanism two decades earlier. 
where the classical "mixed constitution" with its provisions for the 
representation of the "one". the "few". and the "many". or monarchy. 
aristocracy. and democracy. was redefined as an institutional separation of 
powers within which a single "people" controlled all branches of government.28 
In the German states, the intellectual construction of the "people" and the 
"nation" developed along different lines. not only since 1800, when it was clear 
that a repeat performance of the French Revolution, despite considerable 
upheaval in some western regions, was not to be expected. but for several 
decades before that heart-stirring event.29 The notion of a people and a nation 
that were grounded in common language and common ethnicity, as conceived 
in eighteenth-century German idealism and, most notably, in Herder's idea of 
"Volk", was only popularized in the wake of the military confrontation with 
revolutionary France, thus adding the additional element of a "common enemy" 
to the definition of "Volk" and nation.30 Under these circumstances, it was 
surprising that at the very same time, in the first two decades of the nineteenth 
century. a competing conception of the people and the nation was developed 
and propagated, particularly among bureaucratic reformers in Prussia and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent. in the Southern states of the Napoleonic Rhine 
Confederation. Facing the rational imperatives of territorial consolidation. state 
formation, and the legitimation of a reformed yet not revolutionized political 
authority, politicians like Stein and Hardenberg envisioned the--bureaucratically 
induced--creation of a "nation", a concept designating the political society of 
citizens ("Staatsb11rger") that would be entitled to representation in an elected 
parliament and to participation in the state's public affairs.31 The well-calculated 
strategy behind this proposal and its accompanying political measures was the 
presumably stabilizing effect of granting limited participatory rights and of 
drawing a population together that after the territorial reshuffling of the 
Napoleonic Era was more heterogeneous than ever. Beyond the ideas and 
intentions of reformers. the early nineteenth century in Germany witnessed the 
creation of "state-societies", the transformation of a multiplicity of "subjects" 
("Untertanen") that only related individually to the prince, into a single social 
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"fourth estate", while the group of wealthy businessmen was often referred to 
as "monied aristocracy" ("Geldaristokratie"). Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, who in 
his 1850 book on the "Biirgerliche Gesellschaft" clearly acknowledged the rise 
of a new social order, ironically described these limits in social consciousness 
when he doubted the designation of the "fourth estate" as an estate and added 
ironically: "yet in the stubbornness of our corporate conception of society we 
unfortunately still stick to this. "39 
Indeed, the "language of estate" experienced a forceful renaissance during the 
middle decades of the century, a renaissance that altered the meaning of estate 
not only in increasingly conceiving of them as economic units, but also in 
acknowledging that estates were actual social groups with a feeling of 
togetherness among their members, instead of mere points of reference for the 
categorization of individuals (or families). This transformation, which truly 
revolutionized the perception of social order and was soon extended into the 
emerging "language of class", marked the dissolution of vertical and 
hierarchical bonds in society~ and it was probably most clearly visible in the 
changing perception of lower classes, Who turned from unorganized, 
spont~eous, and localized "rabble" into a literally "self-conscious" 
"proletariat", into what Karl Marx: then called a "Klasse fUr sich".40 Only in the 
mid-1840s, with the radicalization of liberalism, was the word "Bfirgertum", 
formerly designating a quality of universalized citizenship and roughly 
synonymous with "civic virtue", re-invented to denote a social group and, more 
specifically, an economic class, thus in many respects rendering a bourgeois 
self-consciousness possible in the first place;41 and during the same time, the 
traditional model of a tripartite order came under heavy attack as liberals and 
radicals feared the vanishing of the "Mittelstand" in a polarizing, dualistic, and 
conflict-ridden society. 42 
The middle decades of the nineteenth century also were the time of a big push 
toward the formation of a "national" society in Germany, a society that 
transcended the boundaries of the individual "state societies" of the reform era 
Nationalism became a mass movement and conceived of all Germans as 
belonging together and, more and more, as deserving a common political 
framework in a newly established "Reich". The extension and intensification of 
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continued to be influential in Germany for a long time and often constituted 
something like the two horns of a self~inflicted dilemma.36 
Against the background of an accelerated crumbling of the "Standegesellschaft" 
in the 1830s and 1840s, with the appearance of both a bourgeoisie of wealthy 
merchants and industrialists and a large group of pauperized poor, and thus 
with an apparent threat to the well-established social order, it is not surprising 
that contemporaries, particularly in the Southern and Western parts of 
Germany, resorted to a vision of unity that Lothar Gall in his seminal article 
has named the "klassenlose Bfu'gergesellschaft". a classless society of citizens 
(--not, in this case, of "bourgeois"!~-V7 This complex and pervasive image of 
society stressed the importance of the "middle" in defining and stabilizing 
society; and it constructed, in a very momentous invention, a future 
perspective, a futurized horizon of time in the imagery of the social order: Even 
if the leveled, equalitarian society of middling persons (conceived of as male 
household heads) was not yet reality, and precisely because its realization 
seemed more and more endangered by new forms of inequality, an idealized 
future was thought to provide the eventual fulfillment of this vision. In this 
sense, the classless society of citizens with its timeless imagination of 
homogeneity was clearly a response to the perceived challenges of social 
change, and hence very similar to the Marxian dream of a classless society that 
would bring class warfares to an eternal end. 
The acknowledgement of "classes", of sheer criteria of economic means as a 
structuring principle of society not buffered by traditional notions of honor, 
respect, and status, was a complicated and difficult process of learning for the 
Vormarz contemporaries, aprocess of which historical research has just begun 
to take notice, a process, moreover, that could follow quite different paths in 
the regional sub-societies of early-nineteenth century Germany.38 Only with 
hindsight is it obvious that during that time a fundamental reconstruction not 
only of the social order, but of its underlying principles occured--people in the 
1830s, however, were accustomed to a society that had always, back to the 
then much-adored example of classical Greece, consisted of "estates", and why 
should they have expected anything else for the future? The new (~-often 




There used to be a time when the historiography on modem Germany focused 
very much on the period from the foundation of the .B&im in 1870171 to its 
eventual demise in 1945, particularly among "critical" social historians who 
since the late 1960s were interested in the specific structural preconditions for 
the rise and success of German fascism. 46 While the "Sonderweg" interpretation 
of German history has long come under heavy attack47 and has therefore, and 
for good reasons, largely withered away in the last decade or so, at least in its 
more crude implications of a "negativized" German version of a "Whig 
interpretation of history", the questions it had raised have not been completely 
solved. If there is no sharp break, no decisive turn towards failure, in German 
history in either "1848" or "1871", how are we to conceive of the problem of 
continuity and discontinuity in the unification period, from the late Vormarz 
through the time of the "inner unification" in the late 1870s? And as the notion 
of a "Sonderweg" grounded in the structure of German society itself--most 
prominently expressed in the "feudalization thesis"--has been tom apart by 
empirical counterevidence, what do we make of the rise of fascism and of 
German "peculiarities" that indubitably existed as much as the peculiarities of 
any other country? Even if the overall economic and social development of 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Germany was fundamentally similar 
to that of comparable industrializing nations, it may still have been perceived 
differently by the contemporaries, and the conclusions drawn from these 
perceptions may have been different. 
Indeed, the problem of German society in this period of time seems to have 
consisted in an ever-widening gap between experience and desire. between 
"reality" and utopia: The social order did not seem to make sense any more; 
everything people were used to was apparently coming apart; and society 
became, paradoxically. too equal and too different at the same time. While the 
uniformity of a "mass society" was dreaded and the Marxist claim to an end of 
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communication, particularly since the 1840s when the construction of railroads 
allowed for easier. faster traveling and the forging of trans-regional social 
networks. played an important role in this process, as did the Revolution of 
1848/49, which in many German regions for the first time created a stronger 
sense of "national" togetherness beyond elite academics. merchants. and 
politicians.43 Communication grew more extensive in its spread across 
traditional boundaries of space and time, and not accidentally did the modem 
notion of "society". the "Gesellschaft" as the all-encompassing entity of 
persons, either within the boundaries of a state or nation or as a more abstract 
concept of a totality of human relations. crystallize in early social scientist 
writing around 1850. thus complementing--not eradicating--the older definition 
as a voluntary. particularistic association such as a club or a joint stock 
company.44 While this new concept of society was readily accepted in the 
entire political spectre, from radicals to conservatives, the next two decades 
saw an at times fiery controversy over the political implications of "society" 
and social science, clouded behind the "technical" question of a separation or 
togetherness of the politically more progressive "Gesellschaftswissenschaft" and 
the more traditional. conservative "Staatswissenschaft".4s As the controversy 
prolonged the eighteenth-century topos of a separation of political and social 
spheres into the second half of the nineteenth century, it also reaffirmed the 
German fixation on an apparent dilemma between a society distant from or 
submerged under the state. 
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colonial beginnings. The rapid formation of social classes in the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century was too pervasive not be acknowledged, but 
it was never really accepted by most people. The older tripartite schemes of 
social differentiation gave way to an increasingly dualistic and conflict-ridden 
perception of social reality as class formation (in a Marxist sense) reached its 
high point in Germany in the decade before 1900.52 
At the same time, the segmentation of society along the lines of what M. 
Rainer Lepsius in his now classic article called "social-moral milieus .. s3 
furthered a feeling of fragmentation and separation, and while fragmentation 
was bemoaned., separation could also be welcomed because it guarded against 
the dangers of class warfare and the interference of other "milieus" and groups 
in one's own affairs in general. This was true for the "negative integration" of 
the working class and the formation of its subculture as well as for bourgeois 
and middle-class groups, but it was the bourgeoisie in particular that 
increasingly framed its depiction of a hierarchical order with the ideological 
vision of a pseudo-egalitarian "Volk". As has recently been shown in a 
perceptive article on celebrations and parades around the famous 
"Hermannsdenkmal", the imagined "people's community" around 1900 still 
served as a vehicle for the internal consolidation and external demarcation of 
the "BOrgertum,,:54 The socially inferior working class masses were included in 
a universal community only to render possible their control and to keep them at 
a safe distance. And yet the desire for unity was not a rationally adopted 
ideology of social control, but expressed serious anxieties about social 
disintegration as well as it paid tribute to the continuing effectiveness of earlier 
visions of unity in the liberal "bOrgerliche Gesellschaft". 
On the other hand, a specific vision. of a homogeneous society was at the 
center of labor movement ideology in Germany since its inception, and the 
striking structural analogies to bourgeois visions of society are less surprising 
given the social background of the labor movement in artisan traditions, a 
background that has been the main focus of attention in labor history for the 
past decade. 55 In this respect, working-class ideology originated as a movement 
of utopian egalitarianism, much like late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth­
century republicanism and liberalism, and endorsed a specific form of a 
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a differentiated class society abhorred, Germans equally condemned the 
consequences of this very class society and longed for an equalitarian 
" Gemeinschaft" , a desire going back to the earlier ideals of "klassenlose 
Bu.rgergesellschaft" and reaching in zenith in the widespread appeal of the 
National Socialist "Volksgemeinschaft". At the same time, German concepts of 
society were thoroughly depoliticized. The failure to establish popular 
sovereignty left society devoid of its function as constituency of the political 
sphere. and the concepts of nation and "Volk" stepped in this vacuum to create 
pseudo-political notions of togetherness. Yet paradoxically again. the 
difficulties and the uneasiness Germans felt about their social order to a large 
degree stemmed from the challenges of forming a truly "national" society in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. a national society that overcame or at 
least superseded previously existing local and regional attachments and thus 
brought the older "island communities"48 in close connectionS with each other-­
connections which often endangered their very identity. This process of 
national society formation through intensified communication. economic 
integration. and change of mentalities, although conspicuously neglected by 
research, gained momentum in the unification era, 49 while on the other hand 
Germans longed to remain a "nation of provincials" and continued to feel most 
comfortable within the specific social bonds and rules of their communities of 
origin.50 The paradoxes and ambivalences of social self-understandings mounted 
among all groups and strata of German society, and the visions relief from this 
pressure were increasingly in discord with the structure of a highly mobile and 
heterogeneous society. 
It has often been noted that German society in the time of the Kaiserreich was 
marked by a rigid segmentation of sub-societies and by an intense feeling of 
social fragmentation. It is true that most industrializing societies experienced 
this "loss" of traditional harmony and homogeneity, and it was an American 
who gave the perhaps most eloquent expression to this feeling when the 
historian Henry Adams in his autobiognWhical "Education" mourned the 
transition from "unity" to "multiplicity" that left him and others without a sense 
of orientation and indeed order of any kind.51 But the sense of disturbance was 
at least as high in Imperial Germany, where people had been accustomed to a 
degree of social and gegraphical stability unheard of in America since the 
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community that many people otherwise longed for: the notion of "mass 
society". While it became popular only in the 1890s, its history reached back 
into the 1830s and 1840s when contemporaries--among them noted 
philosophers like Hegel as well as ordinary academics and bureaucrats-­
described their experience of dissolving estates and of an emgerging "Pobel" 
(rabble) who didn't seem to have a proper place in society and who tended to 
act--at least so the perception went--in undifferentiated crowds rather than as 
individuals.62 While the Vormarz social critics saw the danger of masses within 
an otherwise still structured and orderly society, the concept was later expanded 
toward the meaning of "mass society" as a society where everything was just 
"masses", a society that had completely lost its internal order and boundaries 
and was characterized by an extreme degree of fragmentation and isolation of 
individuals from each other. 
The somewhat contradictory notions of "Vermassung" (the process of becoming 
a mass)· and isolation thus inherent in the concept tried to give expression to 
the experience that everything and everyone was becoming more similar, while 
at the same time similarity did not create bonds, but left people unfamiliar with 
and uninterested in even their close neighbors or inhabitants of the same town. 
In this respect, the late-nineteenth-century processes of internal migration and 
large-scale urbanization63 rather than the dissociation of estates provided the 
background for the contemporary feeling of being lost among look-alike 
strangers, a feeling that Georg Simmel, in his typical impressionist style that 
fitted the subject matter and the overall impressionist Zeitgeist so appropriately, 
summed up in his 1903 essay on "The Large City and Spiritual Life".64 Most 
notably with Gustave Le Bon's 1895 book on the "Psychology of Masses",6s 
descriptions of mass society were often phrased in psychological terms and 
developed close ties to the then emerging--and fashionable--new science of 
psychology: Mass societies generated mental disturbances which in tum caused 
problems in behavior and hence in social relations. This was a widespread 
assumption around 1900 wherever industrialization. urbanization, and migration 
reached their zenith--in the United States and in France as well as in Germany­
., but nowhere was it more ubiquitous and laden with fervent fear and romantic 
ardor at the same time than in Germany, where even socialists like the 
economist Emil Lederer constantly mourned "Entseelung", atomization, and the 
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respectable "klassenlose Biirgergesellschaft" that promised security in the face 
of mounting economic and social pressures. 56 The strength of Marxism in the 
German labor movement underscored these tendencies; Marx himself liked to 
envision the future "communist" society as a society without serious conflicts 
and, even more, without a differentiation of social groups of any kind;s7 he and 
his followers looked ahead--or rather, backwards--to a society where division of 
labor, and the inequality it rendered, did no longer exist; and although he was 
more cautious with contentions about the political "superstructure" of this 
idealized classless society, he also seems to have preferred a homogeneous, 
non-partisan, and conflict-free type of politics. Later, in the Kaiserreich, this 
Marxist flight from reality into the better world of harmony and unity 
crystallized in a chiliastic. semi-religious belief in the revolution as the coming 
Day of Judgement that would ring in the new society.s8 and in preparation for 
this, the German working-class engaged in a cult of equality and comradeship 
at least among themselves, the "Genossen".'9 
On the other hand, there was the reality of classes and class struggle 
("Klassenkampf"), and in a characteristic tension that mirrored the bourgeois 
gulf between the longing for national community and the experience of 
fragmentation, socialist labor ideology, again following Marxian theory as well 
the radical transformation of the liberal language of the middle estate into a 
language of class,60 embraced a rigidly dualistic scheme of social order in 
which the classes of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were pitted against one 
another, a perception that first, in the 1860s and 1870s, lagged behind the 
actual formation of classes among German industrial workers, and later, after 
1900 or 1910, was unable to recognize that the forces of dualistic class 
formation were already weakening again: Caught between the perception of 
ever-warring classes and the ever-adjourned revolution, classes and milieus 
remained consistent and stable, as Klaus Tenfelde has persuasively argued, 
when there was no reason for this consistency and isolation in actual social 
structure any more.61 
There was one strong current of social thought, however, that ran contrary to 
the experience of a rigid segmentation of groups--be it classes, or be it other 
groups--and that also somewhat belied the positive value of a homogeneous 
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misunderstandings, and its importance and eager reception in late Imperial 
Germany and in the Weimar republic owed less to its theoretical subtleties or 
its foundations in comprehensive historical knowledge--in both regards, Max 
Weber unquestionably far surpassed Tonnies--but to its affinity to a widespread 
cultural mood of the time. People were disillusioned and overwhelmed by the 
complexity of modem life as it took shape during the turn of the century, 70 and 
a movement to "reform" every aspect of life sprang up that organized in a 
multitude of "community"-centered clubs and associations, stressing the return 
to simple and direct social relationships in smaller units.71 Ideally, however, 
"Gemeinschaft" should serve as a means to eliminate fragmentation and conflict 
in the society as a whole: The people, or the nation, should thus form a single 
community, and in this respect, many Germans were indeed willing to give up, 
to "sacrifice", individuality for the sake of a congruous community--and they 
would have briskly denied the irony that this imagined community came very 
close to the "mass society" which "community", among other things, sought to 
overcome. 
In terms of social structure and differentiation, the advent of socio-cultural 
modernity around 1900 was marked by the emergence of new social groups, 
and at the same time, the persistence of older ones which earlier seemed to be 
doomed for disappearance, thus doubly belying the notion of an unavoidable 
polarization of society between a small bourgeoisie and an ever-growing 
proletariat. Already in 1897, the prominent political economist and leader of the 
"older school" of German "Nationalokonomie", Gustav Schmoller, concerned 
himself with the question, "What, do we mean by 'middle estate' 
(Mittel stand)?" , and pointed toward the statistical fact that the older, self­
employed middle classes of small shopkeepers and master artisans had by no 
means vanished--or been absorbed by the working class--in Imperial and 
industrializing Germany, but continued to thrive and to contribute a significant 
share of the working population.72 This fact indeed came as a surprise to many 
contemporaries-not only to socialists, who continued to believe in the eventual 
demise of the middling groups--and unleashed a sincere feeling of relief: After 
all, stability and order would still be guaranteed in the future, and the 
"Mittelstand" would be able to further exercise its mediating and balancing 
function among the extremes; social order, so it seemed. had returned from an 
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uprooting of the masses in modem society.66 
During and shortly after German fascism's twelve-year regime, Lederer as well 
as the political philosopher Hannah Arendt developed theories of totalitarianism 
that argued for a close connection between mass society and totalitarian 
politics: Fascism as well as Soviet communism was grounded in a preceding 
destruction of social groups and exploited this destruction as a "state of the 
masses"; a classless, unstructured society was thus dangerous to political 
liberty.67 But this transformation of a critique of mass society into a plea for 
social and political pluralism was not·the typical consequence for Germans 
when they lamented masses, and not accidentally were Lederer's and Arendt's 
books written and first published in the American exile, while German 
sociological thought about the "problem" of the mass after 1945 rather 
resembled the Kaiserreich and Weimar Republic discourse.68 
One way of responding to the dilemma of atomization and "Vermassung" on 
the one hand, class formation and social segregation on the other hand was the 
search for more intimate communities in which presumably both equality and a 
sense of close bonding could flourish. The solution for this problem was the 
"Gemeinschaft", a closely-knit community where everybody knew everyone 
else, where social relationships were plain and direct instead of complex and 
mediated, and where both anonymity and conflict were banished. When the 
philosopher and would-be sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies introduced his theory 
of social bonding framed around the polarized concepts of "Gemeinschaft" and 
"Gesellschaft" ("community" and "society"),69 ~e certainly did not advocate a 
simplified notion of moral superiority of the first over the latter, and he would 
have denied the decidedly conservative implications others saw in what for him 
was an abstract and analytical theory--Tonnies himself was a Social Democrat, 
after alL And yet what he hardly could have denied was that the 
"Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft" concept, which instantly won a popularity the 
author never had expected, fitted in a continuous line of German social thought 
and advanced yet another dichotomy, another rigid dualism in a society that 
was already fraught with constructed contradictions. 
For all his theoretical intentions, Tonnies' concept was prone to 
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Wltil then had largely been separated--, Theodor Geiger in 1932 attempted a 
scientific description of social structure and inequality in Germany on the basis 
of the census of 1925, systematically stressing for the first time the concepts of 
"Schicht" and "Lagerung" (social positioning).19 His elaborate schemes of social 
differentiation and sub-differentiation gave expression to the widespread feeling 
that it was increasingly inappropriate to distinguish simply between two to four 
social classes. 
Perhaps more important still, as Geiger employed the concept of 
"Schichtmentalitat", of social mentalities specific to certain strata of society. he 
introduced a subjective component to the analysis of society and thus 
acknowledged the shaping of social structure by mentality and social 
consciousness. Geigers approach to this problem can be seen as a scholarly 
answer to a mOWlting confusion about the character of Weimar society. as 
nearly every major group conceived of itself--and of society as a whole--within 
a specific framework that legitimized its own social and political aspirations. 
but was incompatible with the schemes of other groups. Weimar society 
certainly was a "split society". as Heinrich August Winkler has called it, 80 but 
the problem was not simply that it was deeply sp.Iit into classes. or estates. nor 
that people severely felt. and suffered Wlder, these divisions. as indeed many 
did. The peculiar feature of German society during this period of time was 
rather that the perceived splits were different and irreconcilable: For workers, 
and commWlist workers in particular, a dualistic class society invariably 
persisted; the old Mittelstand, the peasantry, and parts of the new Mittelstand 
saw a "stindisch" order at the heart of German social structure; other white­
collar employees favored an image of themselves and society as "Schichten". 
while academic professionals stressed the notion of "Berufsstand" (occupational 
estate) as properly fitting their perception of order and inequality. The diversity 
of interpretive frameworks thus markedly Wlderscored the sense of alienation 
and fragmentation in Weimar society. 
Generally, the 1920s witnessed a renaissance of the "language of estate". and 
"Stande"-models of society and of corporatist, authoritarian politics at the same 
time flourished among rightist sociologists and philosophers.81 White-collar 
workers . still cultivated a social self-consciousness based on the notion of estate 
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agonizingly dualistic to a calmer tripartite scheme. 
There were, however, more than these conservative and traditional notions to 
the perception of a new strength of middle classes in Germany at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Even more striking than the persistence of the "old", 
self-employed "Mittelstand" was the rise of the "Angestellten", of white-collar 
employees with clean and respectable office occupations;73 and while 
sociologists and economists, in an amazingly fast-growing body of literature 
that beared witness to the particular German obsession with the coming or not­
coming of class society argued about the categorization of white-collar 
employees as "workers",74 the "Angestellte" were by many, particularly during 
the 1920s, hailed as harbingers of modernity, as the first social group that had 
truly adapted to the challenges of life in the big city, namely in the buzzing 
metropolis of Berlin.75 New means of transport and communication facilitated 
mobility, and new mass media institutions like movie theaters and, particularly, 
radio broadcasting (which officially started in Germany in 1923) sparked a 
positive notion of "mass" society, of a society in which boundaries were wiped 
out and still-persisting "island communities" (Wiebe) were incorporated into 
national audiences, into national clusters of communication that extended 
beyond elite groups, for the first time in history.76 
Despite new anxieties over a vanishing or impoverishment of the middle 
classes in the wake of the German hyperinflation in the early 1920s--anxieties 
which continued to be an important theme of social perception through the 
beginning of the Third Reich77.-, it was clear to most people that a more 
complex class society, if a class society at all, had emerged and was there to 
stay. While Max Weber in his enormous compendium on "Economy and 
Society" stayed within a framework of "class" analysis and tended to see 
classes as an evolutionary goal of modem society, he nevertheless advocated a 
plurality of class concepts and, more specifically, differentiated between four, 
rather than two, major "social classes" in late-Wilhelmine Germany.7. Only a 
few years later, other sociologists went one step further, in some cases 
encouraged by the national occupational census ("Berufszihlung") of 1925 and 
the comparison of its figures to the previous census of 1907. In his innovative 
combination of empirical social research and social theory--two fields which 
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conformist, apolitical unity; it was even particularly popular with the Social 
Democratic Party in the 1920s and early 1930s. When Franz von Papen, in his 
accession speech as Chancellor in June 1930, condemned the "wretched 
community-damaging class-struggle", the official SPD party paper "Vorwirts" 
replied that the struggle between the barons and the people had. first to be 
fought, before a "true 'Volksgemeinschaft'" would then be rendered possible.84 
The "egalitarian" appeal of National Socialism, as crystallizing in the 
"Volksgemeinschaft" idea, has been at the center of a lively debate about the-­
intentional or incidental--social effects of the Third Reich ever since RaIf 
Dahrendorf and David Schoenbaum advanced their theses about a German 
"social revolution" between 1933 und 1945. a rigorous break that. for all the 
atavisms in Fascist ideology, supposedly succeeded in fmally melting down the 
"pre-industrial" cleavages still lingering on in German society!' While the 
nature of those cleavages now appears less certain than almost thirty years ago, 
the recent controversy over "modem" elements and modernizing effects in 
National Socialism has underscored the leveling consequences particularly of 
Nazi social policies and. less unanimously. the significance of equalitarian 
intentions and ideas in Nazi ideology. 86 This revisionism has developed in close 
connection with a minute re-examination of the NSDAP constituency in 
Weimar elections, research that has now all but destroyed the older notion of 
the NSDAP as a party of the radicalized "Mittelstand" and instead stressed its 
widespread appeal among workers and indeed nearly all major groups of 
German society.87 The NSDAP even emerges as the first true "people's party", 
the first German party not to cater to a specific class, estate, religious or 
regional segment of the German people, and it is now widely accepted that the 
Nazi pledge for social unity and community constituted a major element of the 
movement's attraction and reflected a genuine, if deeply ambivalent desire to 
overcome traditional barriers and cleavages perceived to be dominating, and 
harming, the social order. 
As for a tendency toward more egalitarian--or rather, equalitarian, which might 
in this case not be the same--views of society during the twelve years of the 
Third Reich, it is certainly true that the hierarchical "estate" element which 
competed with the "Volksgemeinschaft" idea in the earlier history of National 
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that should help to further set them apart from the working classes. More 
specifically, the idea of "Berufsstand" gained an enormous prominence, 
partially a reflection of an increasing functional specialization in the job market 
and of the pervading influence of self-employed academic professionals--most 
notably, lawyers and physicians--in twentieth-century society. Society as a 
whole did not break down into two classes or three estates of four strata, but in 
a multiplicity of functionally differentiated occupations: This was an experience 
most western nations underwent at about the same time. German social 
discourse, however, did not lay particular emphasis on the "functional", and 
hence implicitly egalitarian, element of occupational differentiation, but stressed 
the estate-like stability of occupational order, in which the specifically German 
idea of "Beruf" as a divine "calling" for one's lifetime of course played an 
important role. When Emil Lederer mused about the effects of the 
"Berufsgedanke" for the integration of modem society, he wondered whether a 
"hierarchical order" of occupations might emerge as a major social principle. 82 
In his perceptive analysis of the language of political discourse in the Weimar 
Republic, Thomas Childers found that bourgeois parties in their campaign 
brochures and posters addressed society in terms of occupational estates, or 
rather: They did not address the unity of society at all, but adhered to a special­
interest orientation that followed the lines of "Berufsstande" . 83 This was 
certainly a way to conceptually avoid class conflict, but it left society 
fragmented (--if in "ordered" fragmentation--). It was only the ingenuity of the 
National Socialists, and one of the major sources of their widespread appeal, 
that managed to transcend the estate order with the unifying notion of 
"Volksgemeinschaft", thus pledging an end to class conflicts without 
endangering the material and status positions of their voting clientele. 
The idea of "Volksgemeinschaft" combined the experience of mass nationalism, 
as it had emerged in Germany in the 1890s and undergone its ordeal in the 
First World War, with the repudiation of social segmentation, and both with the 
utopian vision of a homogenized, if also thoroughly depoliticized, society 
modeled in part after the socialist ideal of classless society. Indeed, the rhetoric 
of "Volksgemeinschaft", as recent research has indicated, not only found 
widespread support and was embraced by many Germans beyond the 




The transformation from Nazi Germany to the Federal Republic--and I will, for 
practical reasons, concentrate on West Germany in the following remarks on 
social self-understandings in the second half of the twentieth century--has long 
been discussed within the framework of "restauration or new beginning?",91 and 
the same question can of course be asked with regard to dominant patterns in 
the interpretation of German society: Have older notions of social order 
fundamentally been reestablished after a short period of turmoil and 
uncertainty, or have older and specifically "German" notions of society given 
way to an adaptation to a "Western" idea of social order (--if that ever 
existed--), thus causing a sharp break in modem German social and intellectual 
history? Recent research, however, has increasingly abandoned the concept of a 
"Stunde Null" inherent in either side of the "restauration or new beginning"­
alternative. stressing instead a period of transition that reached from the last 
years of wartime experience through the first phases of stabilization of a new 
(West) German polity and society, a period characterized by the disruption of 
everyday lifes, the dissolution of order, and the geographical displacement of 
millions of Germans--experiences which other European peoples, and indeed 
many Germans for their religious or ethnic affiliation, had to endure since the 
1930s, but were new for most of the "ordinary" Germans in the core society of 
the "Volksgemeinschaft" that had survived the rigid application of exclusionary 
principles by the National Socialist regime. The 1940s, now often somewhat 
metaphorically labeled as the time "from Stalingrad to 'Wahrungsreform"',92 
probably were the period of the most fundamental and densest transformation 
of society in modern German history, far surpassing the comparatively slow 
changes that accompanied the rise of industrialism in the mid-nineteenth or the 
internal migration processes in the late-nineteenth century. 93 The close 
examination of these changes by social historians has just begun, and if it is 
hence difficult to assess precisely the transformations wrought by flight and 
expulsion, by economic disintegration, by life in the bombed out cities, and 
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Socialism did not win a firm grip on either perceptions or political practices;&8 
and it is also now confirmed by many studies that Nazi social policy was 
particularly eager to make blue and white collar workers more similar, thus 
cracking the rigid division between both. This attempt was successful not only 
in institutional terms, but also regarding the social consciousness of the 
respective groups: White collar employees felt less as a IIStand" , and, more 
important still, workers were endowed with a sense of being an important and 
respected group in the very center of German society, rather than a fringe 
group integrated only "negatively" towards themselves.89 On the other hand, 
Germans in 1933 achieved a clearly pseudo-universalistic unity, a community 
without both pluralism and political society--admittedly, exactly the kind of 
unity many, and at some points perhaps even the majority, of them wanted--, a 
community that had in many respects only changed, not abolished, the rules 
and principles of hierarchy and exclusion: Jews, Communists and deviating 
groups of any kind were intellectually extinguished from imagined social orders 
before their physical liquidation. And even within the confines of the 
"Volksgemeinschaft", the limits of homogenization could be reached quickly 
and became perhaps--further research is necessary on that-more pronounced 
during the economic and psychic hardships of the war on the home-front. liEs 
ist alles wie fIiiher auch", was reportedly the prevailing opinion among the 
population in WOrttemberg in 1941, "hier Bonzen, Plutokraten, Standesdfinkel 
und Kriegsgewinnler und dort das gutmutige, dumme schaffende Volk. Was 
heiBt hier noch Volksgemeinschaft?I'90 The legacy of National Socialism for 
German self-understandings of their society is ambivalent at best, and while it 
facilitated the breakdown of some long-lasting and pervasive notions of 
fragmentation and difference, it left others untouched, implemented new 
differences, and once more prolonged a questionable meaning of social unity. 
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crucible.98 and a few years later. the noted MUnster sociologist Helmut 
Schelsky summed up what he saw as the new distinctive features of West 
German society in the well-known expression "nivellierte 
Mittelstandsgesellschaft" (literally, "leveled middle-estate society"),99 a phrase 
that was immediately criticized for not taking continuing inequalities into 
adequate account. but that nevertheless became popular because Germans 
seemed to feel comfortable with this notion: The ever-hated class conflict, 
indeed conflict and particularism of any kind. could be conceptually abandoned, 
while the idea of "Mittelstand" (rather than "middle class" or even a "middling 
mass society") promised security of one's individual social position against the 
much-feared downward mobility into a proletariat as well as stability of the 
social order as a whole. At last, Germans had found an understanding of their 
society which they felt content with and on which a majority could agree. For 
all its obvious simplification of a complex social reality, Schelskys concept 
(which in many respects only reflected and summarized similar concerns 
among other scholars, writers, and politicians) was important and innovative in 
its implications for a democratized society. Segmentation. estates and 
fragmented "milieus" were gone. an equalitarian order emerged in which a 
reduced form of inequality was conceived in terms of social layers. of 
"Schichten"--a term that also gained prominence in the 1950s and soon 
replaced "Standen and "Klassen" as central categories of empirical social 
research. The "Wirtschaftswunder" experience of consumption, the accessibility 
of cars and refrigerators, and the triumphant advance of the branded and thus 
"equalized" product in the West German economy provided an important 
background to the feeling of a universalized society in which long-standing 
barriers of status and distinction were coming down and where everybody 
could advance to a respectable middling status.1oo 
On the other hand. the "nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft" retained memories 
of a longing for social conformity that only a few years earlier had been 
expressed with "Volksgemeinschaft". and the idea of an "estate"--and be it a 
universal one--still clung to traditional notions of a harmonious order where 
every individual was assigned their "proper" place. This was perhaps less the 
case with Schelsky himself. but with more politically conservative adaptations 
and variations of his interpretation. Ludwig Erhard. father of the "economic 
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later by the integration of expellees and refugees, it is even more difficult to 
evaluate changing perceptions of the social order during this period of time. 
Structurally, German society (in the East as well as in the West) became more 
homogeneous after 1945 with the severance of the Eastern provinces and the 
vanishing of their particular landed elites, and the influx of migrants further 
loosened traditionals German regional structures and the "milieus" that had 
been so pervasive in the decades before.94 This homogenization served as a 
structural advantage in the early history of the Federal Republic, and West 
German society was only established as such through the integration of the 
refugees,9S while this integration, on the other hand, was facilitated by the 
disruptions of everyday lifes among the indigenous population, who often felt 
as "strangers at home" during the mid-1940s.96 Food shortages and the rationing 
of basic commodities produced a feeling of commonality in being dispossessed 
and disprivileged,97 and this experience of a more equalitarian order was carried 
into the 1950s with the popular myth of everybody starting with the same forty 
German marks of cash that were provided in the "Wahrungsreform". In a 
preliminary balance, it seems to me that change, and often fundamental change, 
prevailed in the development of conceptions of society from the 1940s onwards 
to our present time: West German society freed itself from many ambivalences 
and dilemmas that had been central in the "Reich" era from 1870 to 1945 (and 
present for a much longer time); and it will also probably emerge that changes 
both in the structure of German society and in its perceptions were less due to 
the alleged "social revolution" and "equalitarian" impulse of the Third Reich 
than they owed to developments that were based in the eventual exterior and 
interior breakdown of the Nazi empire. Yet for all the predominance of change, 
self-understandings of German society also remained specifically German and 
retained some of their peculiar features and characteristic problems, such as the 
continuing precariousness of political society and the enduring desire for a 
leveling of differences without the destruction of a secure order. 
Both change and continuity are discernible in favorite 1950s and early 1960s 
notions of society that were coined by sociologists, but became unusually 
widespread and familiar among a wider public. Already in 1949, Theodor 
Geiger had described traditional class society as being melted down in a 
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population and asked them where on that scale they would locate themselves. 105 
Although a considerable percentage in these surveys still considered themselves 
as "working class" or, rather, "lower stratum" ("Unterscrucht"), as the 
appropriate category was mostly called, usually at least fifty per cent chose a 
"Mittelschicht" self-rating, and from both above and below so many people 
pushed into the "middle stratum" in terms of their social self-consciousness that 
the "middle" --once again in the history of the topos--became a metaphor for 
mainstream society that excluded only its most obvious fringes. Equally 
important, the now dominant notion of social strata or "layers" provided a 
"gradualistic", instead of a "categorial" (dualistic or tripartite) scheme of social 
interpretation,100 a scheme that provided for easy transitions between layers and 
offered no place for conflict of any kind between social groupS.107 
Both the preference for a gradualistic scheme and the propensity toward the 
"middle" found a popular imagery in the so-called "onion-model" of West 
German society that soon every school textbook on social studies furnished 
(most often in direct contrast to the equally prominent "feudal pyramid" of 
social order): a thick tummy of the ttmiddle stratum", tapering off in a small 
elite or "Oberschicht" at the top and a slightly thicker, though still reassuringly 
small bottom of "lower stratum" and the "socially contempted", as the 
somewhat (but tellingly) odd contemporary expression went. The swinging 
boundaries of the onion created the impression of an integrated, "contained" 
society, of a softly rounded society, of a society that still knew some inequality 
but in which Germans could feel at ease with themselves. 108 
It is much more difficult to grasp changes in the "micro-structure" of German 
society in the second half of the twentieth century: social transformations in the 
realm of private relationships, within families, and generally in the ways 
individuals perceived each other. in the patterns of social expectations and 
behavior toward persons of supposedly "higher" or "lower" social standing. 
These are subjects that have hardly even been noticed by historians in Germany 
as worthy of serious historical research--particularly for the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries and perhaps less so for the early modem era--, as they elude 
conventional Marxian or Weberian categories of social structuration. There is 
also a problem of sources and a difficulty with periodization, because these are 
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miracle" and in his speeches and published writings also an eloquent 
spokesman for a reorganized German society, saw the "classless society" he 
fundamentally endorsed as causing a "spiritual lability" which required the 
political construction of "social stabilizers" that would help fighting the 
isolation ("Vereinzelung") of the individual, and he mourned the "absorption of 
the people in mass societies" as a negative corollary of c1asslessness in much 
the same way as cultural and social criticism had done in Germany for the past 
seventy years. 101 
"Classes" indeed experienced a process of disintegration and dissolution in 
early West German society, 102 both in the stricter sense of socioeconomic units 
and, perhaps even more. in the historically German sense of estate-like orders 
that encompassed a totality of social, cultural, and political structures and 
experiences. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the working class and its 
"milieu". and while Josef Moosers assertion that the working class in West 
Germany became more homogeneous as a "social class" (in a Marxian or 
Weberian sense) during the 1950s and 1960s may be doubted. he is certainly 
right in his observation that its milieu as well as the meaning of belonging to a 
class was in rapid decline.103 With a growing income and the possibility of 
joining the mainstream society of consumption and leisure for the first time, 
workers--as well as members of lower-class service occupations--began to 
consider themselves as belonging to a broad "middle stratum" of society. The 
successful institutionalization of class conflict in the West German model of 
corporate bargaining for the distribution of a fast-growing gross domestic 
product facilitated this perception, as did the tendency toward a greater legal 
and social assimilation of working class and white-collar employees as 
"Arbeitnehmer" who shared many elements of status and economic 
performance.104 
The collective advancement of formerly disadvantaged groups was such a 
pervasive experience during the 1950s and 1960s that people kept comparing 
themselves to their neighbors, and the corresponding mentality of "keeping up 
with the Joneses" found an adequate scholarly expression in the popularity of 
models of social self-assessment in .contemporary sociology. Again and again, 
social researchers presented a scale of social categories to samples of the 
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Both individualization and the decline of deference were expressions of a subtle 
yet sweeping transformation in the Germans' understanding of social order. 
At the same time, they were closely related to changes in the "macro-structure" 
of society and its perception. The grand social groups, mostly defined in some 
sort of economic terms, be they rigid classes or the already loose "layers" of 
society within the "onion-model", seemed to fall apart or, at least, to become 
increasingly irrelevant in the 1970s and 1980s.112 In the wake of the students' 
revolt and the intellectual mood of Neomarxism, the language of class 
experienced a brief renaissance, but failed to persuade ordinary people of the 
appropriateness of its categories and soon withered away completely. As the 
understanding of society was "de-economized", "hyphenated society"-phrases 
flourished that did not refer any longer to a differentiation of society in groups: 
the "Dienstleistungsgesellschaft" and the "postindustrielle Gesellschaft", 113 
among others, became popular expressions in the 1970s, while in the following 
decade, after the experience of "Chemobyl" and the ecological crisis, Germans 
eagerly embraced the notion of "Risikogesellschaft" ("society at risk"); 114 and 
no politician would have dared to speak of "the German people in its groups 
and strata", as Ludwig Erhard did in 1960, fifteen or twenty years later. 1IS 
From the perspective of an individualized society, "estates" and "classes", and 
thus what used to be called "traditional" and "modem" society, seemed to be 
mere variants within a single pattern of vertically structured social orders rather 
than oppositions, so that, with hindsight, the 'Vormarz' contemporaries were 
proved correct when they used a "language of estate" to describe the emerging 
"classes", Yet on the other hand, as the traditional reliability of the group order, 
which had provided security and a sense of belonging, faded away, the desire 
for social distinction was in the 1980s again increasingly expressed through 
life-style, modes of consumption, and forms of symbolic behavior (-­
"LebensfUhrung", in Max Webers still--or rather, again, apt phrase--) much like 
in a "standisch" society, and German sociologists since the rnid-1980s began to 
resort to phrases like "Lebensstile" (life-styles), "Lagen" (social positions), and 
"Milieus" to describe and analyze what they perceived to be the now dominant 
pattern of social structure and inequality.116 A striking feature common to most 
of these concepts is their lack of any political content: They describe an 
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long-term processes that are probably even less correlated to established 
political cesuras than are changes in the "macro-structure" of social estates, 
classes or strata, and yet they are of enormous significance for the actual, day­
to-day fabric of society. In the 1960s and 1970s, a long-standing gradual 
development accelerated in two important respects. '09 To begin with, society 
was thoroughly "individualized". It may seem self-evident to us that the units 
of society are individual human beings,110 but this is a relatively recent notion 
and an even more recent pattern of perception and action. Traditional types of 
society consisted of families and households, usually represented by their male 
heads (--which could create a fiction of a society of individuals--). Since the 
1960s, however, society began to be less dependent on families, for a variety of 
reasons that cannot be discussed here, and more as an entity in which each 
individual person--male or female, young or old--related directly to other 
persons rather than in a mediated way through social superiors. 
As single-person households became widespread and divorces a more or less 
regular feature of the life-cycle, as women went to work and were not any 
longer addressed as "Frau Wilhelm MUller", perhaps the last remnants of a 
hierarchical, "standisch" society, the structuration of society along patriarchal 
family circles, broke apart. 111 Secondly and closely related to this, German 
society (as Western societies elsewhere) became more egalitarian as the decline 
of "deference" gained an enormous momentum during the middle decades of 
the "old" Federal Republic. Germans had long been known to be peculiarly 
prone to deferential behavior, and for all the recent critique of a too simple 
cliche of "Untertanengeist", social behavior in modem Germany had been 
characterized by reverence and aquienscence in a much stronger way than in 
the United States and probably in other European societies. From the mid­
1960s, this traditional deference rapidly disintegrated in all kinds of social 
relationships: between segments of society like the military and civil society; 
between orders and classes, "above" and "below" (for example, in the fading of 
the habit to lift your hat when greeting superiors); between the sexes; and, in a 
true revolution of social behavior, between the generations, as children were no 
longer expected to behave deferentially toward their own parents and toward 
strangers: The boys' "Diener" (a bowing when greeting adults) and the girls' 
"Knicks" (curtsy) largely disappeared, probably at some point in the 1970s. 
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"Gastarbeiter" ("guest worker") and "Auslander" (literally, just "foreigner", but 
laden with specific, Wltranslatable connotations in German) since the beginning 
of massive immigration from Italy, Turkey, and other, mostly southern 
European coWltries into the Federal Republic aroWld 1960. Only the recent 
debate about naturalization and the virtues--or alleged dangers--of a 
"multicultural" society has brought the fact to a wider attention in the German 
public that not only were "Auslander" somehow excluded from most definitions 
of a "German" society, but that they also were largely Wlable to fully join this 
society because of the continuity of a ius sanguinis-definition of citizenship in 
Germany.1l8 What for a long time appeared to be a genuine and new problem 
of the post-1945 Federal Republic now emerges, in historical perspective, as a 
striking continuation of exclusionary principles only shortly after the most 
devastating application of the principle of German "blood" and the 
"Volksdeutsche" in the Third Reich. For all the remarkable changes in the 
intellectual construction of a German society after 1945, for all the jettisoning 
of traditional notions of order and disorder that had thrived in the century 
before, the propensity toward homogeneity and conformity still permeated the 
self-Wlderstanding of society in the Fe<Jeral Republic,1l9 of a society that did 
not provide space for "sub-societies" that could be independent without being 
refused integration. Germans in this respect continued to construct a dilemma, a 
false alternative of "either--or": They expect complete assimilation that includes 
the disavowal of older identities, or else integration will be denied. 
German unification has opened a new chapter in the history of German society 
as well as in the history of its perceptions, but it is not likely to change this 
basic pattern. Political discourse on the social consequences of unification has 
been obsessed from the very beginning with the idea of making not only the 
two parts of Germany, but even the chances of individuals on both sides of the 
former border as soon as possible as equal as possible. The idea of 
"AngleichWlg der Lebensverhiltnisse" is taken for granted in East Germany as 
well as, somewhat grudgingly as it involves higher taxes and slower-growing 
paychecks, in the West, but it is unimaginable in other coWltries and owes very 
much to the persistent mentality of conformed, state-induced equalitarianism 
that apparently survived in both parts of the divided nation. 
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unpolitical society at least as much as an "uneconomic" one, and as they gave 
expression to a hedonistic. self-assured and consumption-oriented society. they 
accurately reflected a predominant feeling among the West German population 
during the last of the "fat years" of the "old" Federal Republic. The vengeance 
came in 1989, when the idea of a "civil society" and the accompanying 
emphasis on the virtue of "BUrgersinn" served as a reminder that social order 
still demanded political foundations and could not survive in permanent 
separation from the "state".117 
Still, principles of exclusion continued to exist in the West Gernlan idea of 
society, and in many respects they retained older notions of distinction, of "in" 
and "out", that had pervaded German history during most of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. As a reaction to mass unemployment and to new forms of 
poverty (--which, in tum, sprang up as a consequence of the "individualization" 
of inequality--), the idea of the "Zweidrittelgesellschaft" ("two-thirds society") 
gained enourmous prominence in the 1980s. It acknowledged the relative 
affluence of a great majority as well as the structural poverty of a minority, and 
it combined a new "class" dichotomy with the contention of a prevailing 
equalitarianism among the upper two thirds. Both elements, however. were 
highly problematic as depictions of social reality, for the tacitly assumed sharp 
boundary between the two main blocks was actually a broad and blurred zone 
of transition; and the economic differences among the well-off were at least as 
strong as inequality between. say, the middle and the lower .third. But this may 
exactly have been the function of the "Zweidrittelgesellschaft"-concept: It 
allowed for contentedness with the virtues of welfare capitalism without 
completely forgetting its "victims"; it legitimized (or rather, concealed) 
continuing inequalities among the majority while at the same time soothing a 
bad consciensce about the exclusion of a minority. and maybe for this reason 
the concept was particularly popular among liberal academics. 
While in this case exclusion and distinction were deliberately constructed as a 
lever for a mixture of reassurance and social criticism, a second type of social 
exclusion was for many decades in the history of the Federal Republic so much 
taken for granted that most people--and even social scientists--hardly noticed 
and acknowledged it at all: the social and legal construction of the 
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history of perceptions of German society. This is not simply trivial, but follows 
from a crucial "meta-transformation" in concepts of social order from the early 
modem era through our present time: the loss of future visions in the shaping 
of social perception and action. While concepts of social order until the early 
modem era were principally stable and envisioned as unchangeable both 
through human intervention and through the activity of abstract forces like 
progress and development, "horizons of expectation", as Reinhart Koselleck 
called it,l23 opened up in the eighteenth century--with predecessors reaching 
back to utopian thought in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries--with regard to 
visions of society and social order as well as in other realms of human thought 
and consciousness. The nineteenth century was the high time in the futurization 
of society, for hopes as well as for apprehensions, in bourgeois ideology as 
well as in socialism. While most projections of social order crumbled in the 
early decades of the twentieth century, they survived, if in a shrinked from, in 
totalitarian visions of a society molded and homogenized by the state--in this 
sense, the last remnants of utopia in Germany tumbled in 1989, when the 
"entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft"124 came to an abrupt end. The opening 
of horizons of expectation now appears to be less a trademark of "modernity", 
as Koselleck claimed, but rather the distinguishing feature of a relatively short 
period of transition. We have not, however, come full circle to the limited 
social consciousness of medieval and early modem societies, for though the 
direction is uncertain, we know that society is ever-changing, and there was 
enough negative experience accompanying "futurized" visions of society, 
particularly in Germany. to deliberately abandon those visions for good. 
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"materialist" presuppositions, tended to look upon history of ideas as one strand 
of the fIord" history it was trying to overcome; these apprehensions of German 
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